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We analyze the theoretical effects on growth and welfare in transition economies of 
emigration of educated and uneducated labor, of higher emigration probability, etc. 
Using a Grossman-Helpman growth model, we show that the prospects of labor 
market integration with the EU raises the expected returns to education, stimulate 
human capital formation and thus raise the growth rate in the candidate countries. 
However, given this expected returns, emigration of educated workers tends to 
lower growth and welfare of those remaining. Thus, while the brain drain reduces 
welfare, the effects of labor market integration could nevertheless be positive. 
Emigration of low skilled workers also reduces growth via adverse effects on 
education. Higher tuition fees, common in transition countries, counteract positive 
growth effects of market determined wages. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
The emigration of skilled workers like scientists and engineers has 
increased over time.
1 The main increases in these flows have been from 
Asia and Central and Eastern Europe into North America, Australia and 
Western Europe. Flows of well-educated workers are also likely to increase 
in the near future as the European Union is enlarged to include a number of 
candidate countries (CCs) in Eastern Europe. Most EU countries will then 
open up their labor markets to the new member countries’ workers. In this 
connection, the discussion has focused a great deal on the level of 
education of the workforce in the CCs and the consequences of emigration 
of the best educated. Many citizens in the CCs fear that the brain drain shall 
reduce growth and welfare in their home countries. 
Emigration from the CCs and other transition countries before 1989 had 
a strong political component as the lack of political freedom, besides the 
prospects of higher incomes, was a principal factor behind emigration. The 
social and economic openness after the fall of communism and the freedom 
of movement changed the balance in favor of economic migration.
2 
Empirical studies conducted after 1990, show that for some CEECs the 
propensity to work abroad has not changed dramatically after the fall of 
communism. Chompalov (2000) finds that the brain drain from Bulgaria 
increased after 1989, but, to the best of our knowledge, other empirical 
analyses of brain drain from candidate countries are not available. The 
Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) remain a major potential 
source of skilled labor for the Western countries. The modest flows of 
skilled workers after the transition to market economies started can be 
explained by regulations and poor labor market performance in the EU 
countries. However, the approaching EU enlargement, in which the labor 
market integration is a major issue, makes the welfare effects of a brain 
drain a highly topical issue on the agenda. 
The discussion of the brain drain has also been stimulated by studies, 
notably Barro (1991), showing that the level of schooling across countries 
is a significant variable for explaining growth rates. Hall and Jones (1999) 
extend the studies by including differences in social infrastructure across 
countries. Bils and Klenow (2000) elaborate further on Barro (1991) by 
studying the dual relationship between schooling and growth. In their 
model, the expected growth rate reduces the effective discount rate that 
                                                            
1 See OECD  (2002). 
2 For a discussion of the interactions between political and economic factors as a 
determinant of migration, see Lam (2002). 2 
 
leads to an increase in demand for schooling. Their overall conclusion 
contradicts that of Barro by showing a very weak direct relationship 
between schooling and growth but a strong effect of growth on schooling. 
In light of these results and the potential for East-West migration after 
the accession of the CCs to the EU, we shall expand on the issue of the 
brain drain and growth. A particular feature to be analyzed is the fact that 
the CCs during the 1990s introduced tuition fees in higher education while 
education before 1990 was financed by taxes.  New private universities 
emerged at impressive rates. In Poland, for instance, 63% of academic 
institutions are now privately owned, in Romania 60 % and in Slovenia 82 
%.  Moreover, budget deficits and the increased competition from private 
universities force the state institutions to find new ways to maintain the 
infrastructure in human capital formation.  
The significant changes of education policy of the CCs affect not only 
the balance between skilled and unskilled workers but also the propensity 
to emigrate to the West. Besides the changes in different types of labor, the 
tuition fee plays an important role in our model since it allows for an 
analysis of education policy in face of a brain drain problem. 
In the centralized system, the rewards to flexibility and mobility of labor 
were almost non-existent. One of the first signals of changes in the 
education policies of the transition countries is the increasing inequality of 
earnings between skilled and unskilled. Clark (2000) investigated the 
returns and implications of human capital investments for Russia during the 
second half of the 1990s and concluded that the university premium is 
increasing in the private sector. While the issue of wage differentials 
between skilled and unskilled workers, to the best of our knowledge, has 
not been studied extensively in the transition countries, it is very likely that 
most transition countries have experienced increased wage differentials. As 
shown in Ivaschenko (2000), the distribution of income became 
increasingly unequal in 25 transition countries during 1989-98, suggesting 
that wage differences increased.
3 
The brain drain is a research issue of a long-standing interest. Recently, 
Mountford (1997) studied the conditions for the brain drain to have positive 
growth effects in the source economy. His paper shows that when 
educational decisions are endogenous and if successful migration is not a 
certainty, a brain drain may increase productivity. Migration to a high wage 
country raises the return to education, which favors human capital 
formation and can outweigh the negative effects of the brain drain. Beine, 
Docquier and Rapoport (2001) specify an OLG model with the same 
                                                            
3 Spagat (2002) discusses the growth consequences of human capital and rising 
inequality in the transition economies. 3 
 
counteracting forces and find that the brain drain may favor the sending 
country if the domestic human capital is stimulated enough.
4 Using a cross-
section of 37 developing countries, they also find that the possibility of 
such a positive effect of the outflow of skilled labor cannot be rejected. 
Our approach is inspired by the growth model in Grossman and Helpman 
(1991a,b), which is extended to analyze the effects of migration of workers 
of different skill levels. Like Mountford and Beine et al, we allow for the 
effect that emigration of skilled workers stimulates education but this 
positive growth effect cannot fully counteract the negative growth effect as 
skilled workers leave the country. However, this does not mean that labor 
market integration necessarily lowers economic growth and welfare in the 
new member countries. We need also to consider that opening up the labor 
markets raises the probability of emigration to high wage countries in 
Western Europe, which in turn raises the returns to higher education and 
thus stimulates more education and raises the growth rate. Only if a large 
enough number of skilled workers emigrate, will welfare fall.  
We find that emigration also of unskilled workers lowers growth and 
welfare. While these workers do not enter the growth generating R&D 
departments, an outflow lowers the relative wage of R&D workers who 





2.  The model 
 
Consumer behavior 




0 U u(t)dt, e
ρ ∞ ≡ ∫     (1) 
 
where ρ is the subjective discount rate and  log u(t) is each consumer’s 
static utility at time t. The instantaneous utility is given by: 
                                                            
4 Wong and Yip (1999) also examine an OLG model and find that the brain drain has an 
adverse effect on static income and reduces growth. In this case, the government must 
use a more aggressive education policy to compensate for emigration of highly skilled 
workers. See also Haque and Kim (1995). An earlier study that found possible positive 







 u(t) ( d(j,t, )d   ) ωω λ ≡ ∫ ∑            (2) 
 
where  d(j,t,ω) denotes the quantity consumed of a product of quality j 
produced in industry ω at time t.  λ>1 represent the extent to which 
innovations improve product quality. 
Each consumer allocates expenditure E to maximize log u(t) given the 
prevailing market prices. Solving this budget allocation problem yields a 
unit elastic demand function 
 
E/p = d              (3) 
 
where d is quantity demanded and p is the market price for the product in 
each industry with the lowest quality adjusted price. The quantity 
demanded for all other products is zero. Given this static demand behavior, 
each consumer chooses the path of expenditure over time to maximize (1) 
subject to the usual inter-temporal budget constraint. Solving this optimal 
control problem yields 
 
ρ - r(t)   =   /E(t)
dt
dE(t)                    (4) 
 
that is, a constant expenditure path is optimal if and only if the market 
interest rate equals ρ. We will restrict attention to steady state properties of 
the model. Then ρ is the equilibrium interest rate throughout time and 
consumer expenditure is constant over time. We let E denote aggregate 




Labor is, in our model, of two kinds: R&D workers, r L , and production 
workers,  p L . We assume that both are in fixed supplies but we shall allow 
for endogenous determination of the length of R&D workers’ education 
implying that human capital supply is endogenous. One unit of production 
workers is required to produce one unit of output, regardless of quality. 
Hence, every firm has a constant marginal cost equal to one. We treat the 
wage rate of production workers as the numeraire and letwdenote the 
relative wage of R&D workers. 5 
 
Consider the profits earned. With the previous state-of-the-art producer 
charging a price of 1, the lowest price such that losses are avoided, the new 
quality good producer earns instantaneous profits 
 
1  (p- )E/p, p
(p) =     






             (5) 
 
where  p is the quality leader’s price. These profits are maximized by 
choosing  p=λ. Therefore, this quality leader earns as a reward for its 
innovative activity the profit flow (1-1/λ)E,  and none of the other firms in 
the industry can do any better than break even by selling nothing at all.  
 
 
R&D activities by firms 
There is a continuum of industries with individual industries indexed by 
ω∈[0,1]. In each industry, firms are distinguished by the quality j of the 
products they produce. Higher values of j denote higher quality and j is 
restricted to take on integer values. At time t=0, the state-of-the-art quality 
product in each industry is j=0, that is, some firm in each industry knows 
how to produce a j=0 quality product and no firm knows how to produce 
any higher quality product. To learn how to produce higher quality 
products, firms in each industry engage in R&D races. In general, when the 
state-of-the-art quality in an industry is j, the next winner of a R&D race 
becomes the sole producer of a j +1 quality product. Since firms are 
Bertrand price-setters, each R&D race winner is able to price lower quality 
competitors out of business and take over the whole market in its industry. 
Thus, over time, product quality improves as innovations push each 
industry up its quality ladder. 
The returns to engaging in R&D are independently distributed across 
industries and over time. In industry ω at time t, let  i A  denote firm i’s 
employment of R&D labor and let  ii ≡∑ AA  denote the industry-wide R&D 
employment. Firm i’s instantaneous probability of winning the R&D race 
and becoming the next quality leader is assumed to equal  i A . Individual 
R&D firms behave competitively and treat A as given. 6 
 
Let υ denote the expected discounted rewards for winning R&D races and s 
denotes the R&D subsidy rate. Then, each firm i chooses its R&D 
employment to maximize instantaneous profits  (1 ) ii ws υ −− AA . In a steady 
state equilibrium, firms will determine their R&D levels so that  (1 ) ws υ =− .  
We will now determine the equilibrium rewards for winning R&D races. 
From equation (4), in any steady state equilibrium, the market interest rate 
must equal ρ. Not only must we discount profits using ρ, but we must also 
take into account that every producer is eventually driven out of business 
by another firm that innovates. This occurs with instantaneous probability 
A. Thus we obtain as equilibrium R&D conditions: 
 
(1-1/ )E







.   (6) 
 
This equation captures the idea that, in equilibrium, a producer is 
eventually driven out of business by innovation. 
 
 
Market for production workers 
We assume that R&D workers can work in the lab and on the factory floor 
while production workers only can work on the factory floor, but not in the 
lab. With  1 p w = , each producer employs / E λ  workers for production. Full 
employment in the labor market for production workers then implies that 
 




A drawback of our analysis above is that we have no theory of how much 
education workers demand implying that there is no adjustment on behalf 
of individual workers’ human capital formation. Evidently, education for 
R&D is highly demanding and it seems inappropriate to assume that all 
individuals in an economy have the choice of becoming a scientist or R&D 
worker. As in the previous analysis, and in line with many other human 
capital studies, we therefore continue to assume that a number p L of workers 
lacks the capability to acquire higher education while r L have this 
capability. The difference is that r L now faces the decision to determine the 
number of years in higher education,S . An increase in  r L relative to 7 
 
p L could represent either an increase in the number of workers capable of 
acquiring an R&D education, or some university reforms that would imply 
that less ability is needed for a given university education.   
Each worker works a finite length of T  years. With S  years of 
schooling, the individual accumulates () hS of human capital, which is an 
increasing and concave function.S years of education yields a flow salary 
of () hSw wherew now is the reward to one unit of human capital. However, 
with some probability P the worker finds a job abroad that pays a fixed and 
higher wagew. Thus, the expected flow salary becomes  () ( ( 1 )) hS P w Pw +− . 
To determine the optimal number of years of schooling, the individual 
must consider the benefits and costs of marginal additional schooling,dS . 
The gains to be made from extra schooling equal the extra return in this 
state(( 1 ) ) ' ( ) Pw P w h S +− . Thus, the marginal benefits [] (( 1 ) ) ' ( ) Pw P w h S dS +−  
can be reaped during the period tS + to tT +  and the present value of these 
earnings equal  [] () ( ( 1 ) ) ' ( ) /
ST ee P w P w h S d S
ρρ ρ
−− −+ − .  
During  dS  the student has no income and had he worked, expected 
income would have been(( 1 ) ) ( ) Pw P w h S dS +− . Moreover, for each year of 
study, the individual pays a tuition fee of F. Hence, the marginal cost of an 
extra unit of schooling is the forgone earnings during the period tS +  to 
tSd S ++  and the annual fee, or  [] (( 1 ) ) ( )
S eP w P w h S F d S
ρ − +− + . The first-
order condition, i.e. marginal benefits equal to marginal cost, yields  
 
[] () (( 1 ) ) ( )
(1 )
(( 1 ) ) ' ( )
ST Pw P w h S F
e
Pw P w h S
ρ ρ − +− +
−=
+−
.                 (8) 
 
At each instant, we have (/) r STLin school and (1 / ) r STL − working in the 
R&D departments. 
The supply of human capital is the product of the number of educated 
R&D workers, their work life and each individual’s human capital, or 




≡− . As firms do R&D they demand A of human capital per 
industry. Thus, full employment of human capital in laboratories equals 
 









To close the model, we need to determine consumer expenditures. 
Consumer expenditure E
 must equal wage income plus interest income on 
assets owned minus taxes paid to finance the R&D subsidy. The value of 
all assets, A, equals the stock market value of all firms: 
 
1 A=w( s) −              (10) 
 
Then  A ρ  is interest income. To determine the tax revenues that need to 
be raised to finance the R&D subsidies, we note first that A workers do 
R&D. These workers are paid wA and the government pays the fraction s of 
this wage bill. Thus, the government must raiseswA in taxes to finance the 
R&D subsidy. The government taxes all wage and interest income. Finally, 
to determine consumer expenditures on goods we need to deduct the 
students’ tuition fees but these fees pertain to the government that passes 
them back to the consumers in a lump-sum manner. Hence these fees 
cancel out from the expenditures expression. The value of purchased goods 
then becomes: 
 
() ( ) (1 ) 1 pp EL w w ss w L w s ρρ =++ − − =+ − + AAA .         (11) 
 
 
Growth and welfare  
We calculate consumer welfare (discounted consumer utility) starting from 
time  t=0. Remember that all consumers are assumed to have identical 
preferences. Consider first the utility of a consumer with steady state 
expenditure e. At any point in time, this consumer only buys the highest 
quality product in each industry, and from (3), this consumer’s static 
demand function is given by d(j,t,ω)=e/p(j,t,ω). The consumer buys from a 
producer charging the price λ. Before we substitute this information into 
(2), we note that, in this equation, 
1
0
log log dt λω λ = ∫ A . A is the instantaneous 
probability of R&D success. Substituting the above information into (2) 
yields the consumer’s instantaneous utility  
 
log ( ) log ut t λ = A .    (12) 9 
 
Differentiating (12) with respect to time yields growth as
5  
 




λλ =− = A .           (13) 
 
To obtain overall consumer welfare we set eE =  and substituting (13) 
into (1) we get welfare as  log / log( / ) WU E ρ λ ρ λ == + A . Merging g with this 
expression, and utilizing (4) and that  p λ = we find that welfare is  
 
/l o g Wg d ρ =+    (14) 
 
Welfare is thus the sum of discounted growth and static demand. 
Welfare per capita is  /( ) pr WL L +  which is relevant when we discuss the 




3.  Results 
 
The system of five equations, (6), (7), (8), (9) and (11), solves for four 
variables w, A, E and  S. Obviously, with five equations and four variables 
the system is over-determined. However, using (6) through (9) in (11) 
shows that this last equation also is satisfied. Hence, we can drop equation 
(11). By eliminating E, we reduce the remaining equation system to three 
equations. We first solve for w,  A, S and can then straightforwardly obtain 
the effects on expenditures, growth and welfare. The remaining three-





(1 ) (1 ) ( ( ) ( ) ' ( ) )
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(( 1 ) ) ' ( )
rp
ST
FP LL hS S ThS
TP w Pw H S
D
Fp w P w h S h S
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−− + − 
+  +− +  = 
 ++ −  −− −   +−  
 .           (15) 
 
A sufficient, though not necessary, condition for this determinant to be 
positive is that (() ( )' () ) hS S Th S +−  is negative. This condition can be 
rewritten as  /( ) SST ε >−  where ε  is the elasticity of human capital with 
                                                            
5 The growth rate of utility can be shown to be identical to the growth rate of real GDP, 
see Lundborg and Segerstrom (2002). 10 
 
respect to an increase in schooling years. This elasticity is reasonably 
positive while the left hand side of the condition is negative.   
 
 
Opening up for emigration 
Before 1990, the probability of emigration to high-income countries was 
virtually zero in the candidate countries. As economic and political 
freedom increased, and in particular when the countries started to discuss 
membership in the European Union, the prospects of higher income via 
emigration increased. Thus, the opening up for emigration implies that, 
with some probability, a worker may obtain a higher wage by emigrating 
and accepting a work abroad. This option will, by itself, have effects on the 
economy as it raises the expected gains from higher education, i.e. the 
expected university premium. The effects of increasing the probability of 
emigration on optimal schooling years obtain as  
 
2
1( 1 ) ( )
0
(( 1 ) ) ' ( )
SF s w w
PDP w P w h S
ρ  ∂− −
=> 
∂+ − 
            (16) 
 
i.e. an increase in the probability raises the length of optimal education. 
We note from (17) that the effect is larger the larger the wage difference to 
the potential emigration country is. Notable is also that the effect crucially 
hinges on the tuition fee: if this is zero, the first order condition is 
unaffected by the probability. (See equation (8).)  
Is there any evidence in favor of such an effect as suggested in equation 
(16)? It is possible to classify the transition countries according to their 
probabilities of joining the EU. Before 1994, there was not much 
discussion of EU membership, but after this year the probability of 
membership, and hence access to the EU labor markets increased in 
Poland, Hungary, the Baltic countries, the Czech Republic and Slovenia. In 
the remaining transition countries not much happened that would raise the 
possibilities of emigration to richer countries. 
While no data exists on the evolution of optimal schooling years, we 
show in the Figure 1a and b how enrollment rates in higher education have 
changed in transition countries during the 1990:s. We have classified 
countries according to the possibility of accession to the EU in 1994. 11 
 
Figure 1a and 1b. Changes in enrollment rates to tertiary 
education, 1989-94 (panel a) and 1994-99 (panel b). 
 
Countries to the right, in each panel, have the highest probability of 
becoming members (Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Latvia, 
Estonia and Lithuania), while countries to the left have low, or zero, 
probability of becoming a member. We see that there is not much 
difference between the two groups in the period 1989-94. In the period 
after 1994, however, all countries in the high probability group increase the 
share of tertiary education a great deal and there seems to be a clear 
tendency that countries in this group have increased considerably more 
than in the leftward, no-applicants, group. This is certainly no evidence, but 
it suggests that prospects of EU membership stimulate higher education. It 
is an issue for future research. 
The increase in the probability of emigration to a high wage country 
reduces the domestic R&D wage: 
 
2
(1 ) ( ( ) ( ) ' ( ) )
0
(1 ) ( 1)







   (17) 
 
The prospects of emigration to a high wage country should lower the 
wage, which is the reward to one unit of human capital. This fall is 
consistent with the increase in schooling years that has increased the supply 
of human capital. The wage effect crucially hinges on the effects on 
optimal schooling. 
How is growth affected? On the one hand, the higher probability of 
emigration means that R&D workers now spend more time in school, 
which reduces the number of R&D workers available in the laboratories. 
On the other hand, each R&D worker has a longer education that should 
raise human capital. The net effect is unambiguously positive: 
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The quantitative effect hinges crucially on the length of the work life, T. 
The longer the work life the larger is the positive effect on growth. A basic 
condition for the positive growth effect is, of course, that the higher 
probability of emigration has a positive effect on optimal schooling. 
Assuming that there is a positive probability of emigrating we can show 
that the effects of an increase in the R&D wage, w, in the potential 
emigration country are quantitatively identical to those of an increase in the 
probability of emigration (at any positive P). 
So far, we have kept factor supplies constant, which, of course, is an 
unrealistic assumption: For a given probability to be realistic for the long 
run, emigration should occur at the same rate as the probability. Below we 
focus on the effects of exogenous changes in the supplies of R&D and 
unskilled labor. 
 
Effects of factor supply changes 
Before we analyze the effects of the brain drain, i.e. decreases in the 
supplies of R&D workers, we shall first discuss the effects of changes in 
production workers. The comparative static effects of a decrease in 
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  (19) 
 
In a country from which production workers emigrate the relative wage 
of the R&D workers goes down. As expected, the increase in relative 
supplies of R&D workers lowers the relative wage of R&D workers. 
We next consider the effects on optimal schooling years: 
 
2
1( 1 ) ( 1 )
0
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   (20) 
 
In a small emigration country, students will demand less education as 
production workers leave the country. This is in line with the decrease in 
the wage of R&D workers, which has lowered the university premium and 
thus reduced the incentives for schooling. However, we also see that the 
result hinges on the existence of the tuition fee. (Cf. equation (8)).  13 
 
Emigration of production workers then implies that domestic R&D workers 
would find that their salaries are falling and that they will reduce the time 
spent in school. As domestic educated workers lose, this emigration policy 
tends to decrease the income differences between the skilled and unskilled 








−− <     (21) 
 
i.e. domestic R&D workers lose as compared to production workers. 
To explore the effects on the growth rate we differentiate (13) with 
respect to a decrease in p L to get 
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A        (22) 
 
In many other growth models a decrease in production workers raises 
growth since less workers can be put into R&D. Here, the effect runs solely 
via decreased optimal education that lowers the growth rate.  
Before we can evaluate the welfare effects, we need to determine the 
effects on expenditures. They obtain as: 
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. We are, however, more interested in how 
welfare per remaining worker,  /( ) pr WL L +  is affected. We find that  
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Welfare among the remaining workers thus falls since both the growth 
effect and the static consumption (expenditure) effect are negative. 
  14 
 
Brain drain 
The central interest of this paper is the effects of an outflow of R&D 
workers. To explore that we shall do the corresponding comparative static 
experiments as above but for R&D labor. We find the wage effects of a 
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As expected, the relative wage rises as the supply of R&D workers 
decreases. We expect this increase to be accompanied by an increase in the 
optimal schooling years. Indeed: 
 
22
(1 ) (1 ) ( 1) ( ) 1
0




FP hSL S T
LD P w P w h S
λρ
ρ
 −− −  ∂
−= − > 
∂+ − + 

A
.   (26) 
 
As the number of R&D workers decreases, the students prefer a larger 
number of schooling years. We see that a positive tuition fee, F, is a 
necessary condition for a change in the number of R&D workers to affect 
schooling years. The fee causes the wage to affect benefits of schooling 
more favorably than the costs of schooling. 
This increase in years of schooling, in turn, suggests that growth could 
rise, counteracting the initial negative effect of the outflow of educated 
people. To obtain the net effect, we differentiate growth with respect to a 





















A            (27) 
 
Thus there is an unambiguously negative net effect on growth. While the 
economy benefits from the increase in schooling years increase it also loses 
from the outflow of R&D workers. The net effect is a negative.  
We turn now to the welfare effects. Since the demand curve is unit 
elastic, so is the demand curve for R&D workers. From this follows that 
expenditures are unaffected. From (11) this implies that welfare is solely 
determined by the growth effect, i.e. welfare decreases. 15 
 
To sum up the results so far, we thus see that the emigration country loses 
from an outflow of unskilled production workers as well as from an 
outflow of R&D workers. 
 
 
Effects of education policy 
We noted that the effects of labor migration crucially hinge on the 
existence of the tuition fee. As noted in the introduction, privatization of 
the education system is a prominent feature of the transition countries and 
rising private costs of higher education has followed. Remembering that 
hardly any private institutions existed in the centrally planned economies, 
Table 1 shows the drastic increases in the share of private academic 
institutions that has taken place in transition economies up to the year 
2000/2001. 
 
Table 1: Total number and share of private academic 





% private  Total number 
Albania 0  11 
Belarus 26.3  57 
Bulgaria 10.3  88 
Croatia 34.6  26 
Czech Rep.  33.3  42 
Estonia 60  35 
Hungary 51.6  62 
Latvia 39.4  33 
Lithuania 9.6  42 
Macedonia 33.3 3 
Moldova 50  114 
Poland 62.9  310 
Romania 59.3  140 
Russia 37.1  965 
Slovak Rep.  10  20 
Slovenia 81.9  11 
Ukraine 16.4  979 
Note: Data in Table 1 is from UNESCO-CEPES (European Centre for Higher 
Education) www.cepes.ro/information_services/statistics.htm  16 
 
The existence of the tuition fee in the model allows us to evaluate the 
effects of education policy. An increase in the tuition fee raises the costs of 
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This drop in education years lowers the supply of human capital, which 
in turn raises the wage, i.e. return to human capital: 
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As a direct consequence of the drop in years of schooling, the inputs of 
human capital should fall: 
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As each R&D worker get shorter education, the stock of human capital 
goes down and with it, the inputs of R&D in firms. This reduces the growth 
rate since log g λ = A . Since expenditures are unaffected (F is returned to the 




4.  Consequences for transition economies 
 
Soon after the fall of the centrally planned systems in Eastern Europe, the 
discussion started about the consequences of labor inflows to the EU. This 
discussion was gradually intensified as it was clear that many transition 
countries aimed at membership in the European union, which would imply 
free labor mobility. The early projections claimed that the bulk of 
emigration would consist of skilled workers, particularly since these 
workers were considered to be relatively underpaid in the socialist 
economies. However, as the economies were transformed into market 
economies the relative wages of the skilled workers are likely to have 
increased. Today, it is not obvious that the skilled workers of the candidate 
countries have stronger incentives to emigrate than the unskilled. 17 
 
On the other hand, it is clear that the increased university premium has 
stimulated higher education, implying that the potential number of skilled 
emigrants has increased. This development has only partly been 
counteracted by the increases of the tuition fees of higher education. 
In this paper we have specified a model to capture several of these 
developments. We first showed that the mere possibility of emigration to a 
high wage country has important effects. If a skilled worker contemplates 
to emigrate to a high wage country, his expected returns from schooling 
rises and he selects a longer education which raises human capital and thus 
the growth rate. We also presented evidence in line with the notion that the 
growth of enrollment in higher education is higher in those countries where 
the prospects of becoming member of the European union is the highest.  
To the extent that the possibility for emigration is manifested in 
emigration of skilled workers, this brain drain would raise the wage of the 
skilled and thus stimulate more schooling among those who stay. While the 
economy is left with fewer skilled workers, which lowers growth, the 
workers left behind would be better educated, which raises growth. The net 
effect on growth is unambiguously negative and welfare is reduced.  
This does not mean, however, that labor market integration between the 
present EU members and the candidate countries necessarily will lead to 
lowered growth and welfare in the CCs. The mere rise in the possibility to 
emigrate to high wage countries in the EU will stimulate education and 
thus growth. Clearly, the CCs would benefit the most if the probability of 
emigration increased as much as possible and as few as possible of skilled 
workers emigrate. It should be recognized, though, that a high probability 
cannot be maintained in the long run unless also workers really emigrate. 
We also find that an outflow of unskilled workers would lower growth 
and welfare. In this case, the lowered supply of unskilled workers lowers 
the relative wage of the skilled and thus reduces the incentives for higher 
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